worried that the common law was bad for business. Although he recognized the political importance of common law institutions such as juries, 1 he also thought that the cumbersome procedures of English courts might hamper economic development in England and its colonies. 2 The
1669, tried to reconcile these competing political and economic concerns. Although the Constitutions guaranteed "Freemen" a right to trial by jury, the document also provided for specialized judges in port towns to "try cases belonging to [the] law-merchant." 3 These commercial judges would allow merchants to settle their disputes "as shall be most convenient for trade," rather than by the expensive formality of the common law. 4 In the 1690s, Locke, then a member of the Board of Trade, again looked for a way to resolve commercial disputes in a manner more "convenient for trade" than ordinary courts. But instead of again turning to merchant judges, he drafted a statute that directed existing courts to enforce arbitration agreements. 5 This time, rather than erecting new tribunals, the state would outsource commercial dispute resolution to private arbitrators.
Locke's two proposals reflected an enduring problem for British policy makers in the century before the Industrial Revolution. Throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, lawyers and merchants alike warned that English law was inadequate for a modern economy. 6 Their concern was partly with substantive law, but they also argued that English procedure-with its cumbersome pleadings, expensive lawyers, and judges inexperienced in trade-was poorly suited to commercial litigation. One option was to reform the Westminster courts, either judicially or legislatively, 7 but many commentators argued that merchants needed a radically different alternative: either commercial courts, as Locke suggested for Carolina; or court-enforced arbitration, as he proposed to the Board of Trade. These proposals had very different fates. Arbitration became ubiquitous and, especially after 1750, increasingly "court-related" and "legalized." 8 Proposals for commercial courts, however, repeatedly failed until the 1890s. 9 Britain's decision not to create merchant courts poses a puzzle. Historians have noted that the absence of merchant courts is "curious" and "very different from" the practice elsewhere in Europe, 10 where commercial courts were common. 11 But although scholars have long emphasized the significance of eighteenth-century commercial law 12 -whether as an influence on founding-era procedural rights 13 or because of the Weberian debate over the importance of law for economic development 14 -scholars have never explored one of its most salient institutional features: its development within ordinary courts. Instead, scholars have assumed "that there was no general desire among merchants for a special court" during the eighteenth century. 15 But as I will describe below, this is simply false. 16 And even if eighteenth-century merchants did fail to pursue commercial courts, it still needs to be explained why their preferences differed from those of merchants elsewhere in Europe and in nineteenth-century Britain.
This article offers the first explanation for Britain's decision not to create a merchant court. Britain made that choice not because merchants did not want one (they did), nor because it was alien to the English legal tradition (it was not), 17 but because of a combination of interest and partisan politics. Starting in the seventeenth century, English lawyers resisted the creation of courts merchant, which would have threatened their monopoly on litigation. (Merchant courts emerged more successfully in the colonies, where the bar had less power.) 18 In the 1760s, however, the need for a merchant court became more acute, as litigation levels rose, legal costs skyrocketed, 19 and dispute resolution became increasingly expensive. 20 However, just as merchant courts should have been most appealing, 21 political polarization impeded institutional innovation, as radical Whigs opposed the creation of any new court that might undermine civil juries. 22 Meanwhile, several reforms to common law litigation, particularly the expanded use of merchant juries, reduced pressure for more fundamental reform and allowed political concerns to predominate. 23 Britain's decision not to create merchant courts in the eighteenth century offers a new perspective on juryless litigation in Anglo-American law, both as a means of resolving private disputes, and as a tool of the administrative state. The enduring absence of merchant courts enabled theorists such as Albert Venn Dicey to posit an Anglo-American legal tradition in which specialized courts had no place. 24 Instead, Dicey and like-minded authors argued, English and American litigants traditionally resolved their disputes in "ordinary" courts or through "private" arbitration. The result has been a lasting discomfort with juryless courts that continues to trouble scholarship on civil litigation and administrative law.
I. Inadequate Alternatives to Merchant Courts
Eighteenth-century merchants had three principal means of resolving a commercial dispute: they could litigate in ordinary courts, arbitrate the dispute informally, or pursue formal, court-enforced arbitration. In the 1760s, the inadequacy of these choices led merchants in many cities to develop a fourth option: arbitration facilitated by chambers of commerce. None of these methods, however, proved fully satisfactory.
A. Litigation
Early modern merchants avoided litigation for reasons of cost, predictability, and reputation. Creditors often sued to collect simple debts, 25 but merchants hesitated to litigate more complex cases, a fact reflected in declining litigation volume between 1690 and 1750. 26 England, litigation expenses doubled between 1680 and 1750 27 and continued to rise throughout the eighteenth century, 28 so that costs often exceeded the amount recovered. 29 Litigation in colonial courts was likewise extraordinarily expensive, relative both to the sums at issue and to average incomes. 30 Moreover, English fee-shifting rules, which required a losing plaintiff to bear all litigation costs, made lawsuits risky for all but the surest cases. 31 Jury trials were particularly expensive and-because the outcome seemed to depend mostly on lawyers' tricks and juries' whims-unpredictable. 32 Many merchants considered litigation not just imprudent but also dishonorable. 33 Daniel Defoe, for example, argued that a trader "that will seek Justice in the Law, ought to be first very sure he can obtain Justice no other Way." 34 Religion reinforced this norm among Quakers, who were prominent in many mercantile communities. 35 consequences for obtaining insurance, 37 credit, 38 and even success in future litigation. 39 
B. Informal Arbitration
The disadvantages of litigation led many merchants to prefer arbitration, which they perceived as relatively cheap and predictable. As one merchant explained, arbitration could be "decided by three men who no doubt I shall know & without any considerable expence," whereas litigation was "left to the decision of 12 men, who I may not know & likewise done at a very heavy expence." 40 Arbitration also offered merchants a way to resolve disputes in a manner more sensitive to their reputational needs. Unlike litigation, which necessarily focused on a single cause of action, arbitration offered a way to conclude "all manner of . . . Actions . . . depending . . . between the said Parties," whether "trading Differences" or "private Injuries." 41 As a result, a successful arbitration could restore the relationship between disputants, as well as protect their reputations. 42 Finally, arbitration offered several functional advantages: compared with common law courts, arbitrators could hear a broader set of actions, 43 employ more relaxed evidentiary rules, 44 supervise documentary discovery, 45 and order a broader range of remedies. 46 Nonetheless, arbitration had a major disadvantage: it was ultimately voluntary. 47 In 1661, for example, the merchant Thomas Crocker complained that he had been thrown into debtor's prison during litigation over a sale of goods, despite having offered repeatedly to arbitrate. "For prevention of such hellish practises," he wrote, "it were to be wished, that there were a Court Merchant erected in England, as is usual in other Countries where Trade is most encouraged." 48 A merchant court, Crocker suggested, would be able to compel even litigious parties to settle disputes in a more efficient-and humane-manner than the common law.
C. Formalized Arbitration
Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the voluntariness of arbitration was a fairly minor problem for merchants, who were usually able to resolve 47. As I explain in the next section, parties could bind themselves ex ante to arbitrate disputes, but only by mutual consent. By the eighteenth century, judges could also "refer" cases to arbitration-that is, recommend that the litigants agree to arbitration-a suggestion that the parties typically accepted. Nonetheless, parties averse to arbitration were able to avoid it.
48. Philadelphus Verax, The Knavish Merchant (Now Turn'd Warehouseman) Characterized or a Severe Scourge, for an Unjust, Cruel, and Unconsionable Adversary (London 1661), 5-6. The author described himself as "a cordial friend to his honest (though injuriously oppressed) acquaintance Thomas Crocker." disputes without invoking courts. 49 That began to change in the 1750s: for a number of reasons, merchants began looking for more coercive means of settling their disputes. 50 As a result, arbitration became "increasingly legalized," 51 "formalized," and "court-related," 52 both in England and in Britain's colonies. Lawyers became more frequently involved as arbitrators and advisors to the parties, arbitral procedures became more complex, and courts intervened more frequently to enforce awards. 53 Although the formalization of arbitration made it easier for merchants to commit to arbitration ex ante, it also introduced new problems. Merchants still had no mechanism for compelling arbitration after a dispute arose. As a result, a vexatious litigant could still force a case into court. 54 At the same time, formalized arbitration took longer and cost more than informal arbitration. 55 Finally, merchants complained that as lawyers became more involved, they introduced the very legal formalities arbitration was supposed to avoid. 56 As a result, by the 1760s, arbitration had become both insufficiently coercive and too much like litigation.
D. Chambers of Commerce
Growing dissatisfaction with arbitration led many business communities to experiment with yet another alternative to litigation: chambers of commerce. Eighteenth-century chambers often functioned like their modern equivalents, bringing a local business community together for lobbying purposes. 57 But they also provided a forum for dispute 49 resolution, 58 which typically involved a relatively formal set of procedures, including appeals, but without recourse to courts. 59 Enforcement of judgments depended upon fining or expelling members. 60 In a sense, these chambers were essentially secular versions of Quaker "arbitration courts" that had been operating for more than a century. 61 Nonetheless, the chambers proved inadequate for several reasons. Because they were not established "by Authority," as one proponent of merchant courts complained, they necessarily relied on the voluntary cooperation of their members, which was insufficiently reliable to provide a stable forum. 62 Moreover, these fundamentally local associations could not resolve disputes with non-members in other cities. Chambers of commerce approximated merchant courts but could not replace them, which is perhaps why they never heard more than a few cases each year. 63 Nonetheless, their emergence after 1760 underscores merchants' appetite for alternatives both to arbitration and litigation in ordinary courts.
II. The Movement to Create Courts Merchant
The inadequacy of existing options led some merchants and economic writers to call on Parliament to create merchant courts. As England grew into a modern commercial nation in the century after the Restoration, many observers believed that the only way to ensure the country's continued economic vitality was to extend England's tradition of using specialized courts for commercial disputes.
A. England's History of Specialized Civil Courts
Specialized courts had a long history in England. Examples relevant to commerce included the medieval piepowder and staple courts, 64 early modern bankruptcy commissions, 65 and the Elizabethan Court of Assurances. 66 By the end of the seventeenth century, all of these had fallen into disuse, 67 although other forms of juryless adjudication survived and even expanded in the eighteenth century. 68 particularly prominent. Their summary procedure carried obvious risks for defendants-Blackstone declared that their "rigour and arbitrary proceedings" were "hardly compatible with the temper of a free nation" 69 -but merchants appreciated their speedy determinations. 70 For civil litigants, perhaps the most important specialized courts in the eighteenth century were courts of requests: juryless courts, supervised by lay "commissioners," with jurisdiction over suits for small debts (typically under 40 s). Although the courts, also known as courts of conscience, dated at least from the reign of Henry VIII, they fell into disfavor during the seventeenth century, in part because of the Stuarts' abuse of juryless tribunals. 71 During the Interregnum, however, with the Stuart threat (temporarily) eliminated, the Hale Commission recommended a national network of small-claims courts. 72 Following the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, courts of requests again became controversial, 73 but after the Glorious Revolution, and again in the 1740s, growing frustration with the cost of debt litigation led to the creation of several new courts of conscience in important commercial centers. 74 Between 1748 and 1800, Parliament or the crown chartered new courts of requests nearly every year, including in India 75 and Sumatra. 76 In 1779, the secretary of state for the colonies directed the governor of Quebec to erect such a court, which he called "necessary for the convenience of both Debtor & Creditor." 77 Creditors, at least, seem to have agreed: many courts of requests saw their caseloads rise significantly, even as litigation in most other courts declined. 78 Their success is particularly remarkable in light of repeated complaints about their maladministration, particularly in London. 79 The vitality of courts of requests led some policy makers to see them as a solution to the perceived inefficiency of civil litigation, and politicians occasionally suggested expanding their subject-matter jurisdiction. 80 Nobody, however, suggested that these courts-staffed by amateur judgesoffered a suitable venue for more complex commercial cases. Their jurisdiction generally remained confined to simple debts under 40 s. "Debt," moreover, was construed strictly to exclude any actions involving real property or actions on the case for breach of agreement or unliquidated damages. 81 Litigants sometimes tried to circumvent these jurisdictional limits by instituting multiple suits, each worth less than 40 s, to recover on a larger bond. 82 These efforts reveal both the inadequacy of existing small-claims courts and-because some litigants preferred to undergo criticism evolved as arbitration became more formalized, eventually focusing more on court-enforced arbitration's excessive legalism. 92 Authors did not always specify exactly what a merchant court would entail. Proposals usually referred to a few fundamental features: merchant judges; a faster, simpler procedure than ordinary courts; low fees; decisions based on mercantile custom; and state authorization that would enable some type of compulsory process. Other details varied. The proposals of Josiah Child (1693) and Daniel Defoe (1697), for example, both suggested allowing limited appeals from the trial judges to a second panel, also composed of merchants. Child and Defoe also agreed that no appeal should lie from courts merchant to ordinary courts. Child's proposal offered a more detailed plan for regulating costs, 93 whereas Defoe focused more closely on procedural rules. 94 Both authors also gave merchants a role in selecting the judges. For Defoe, that meant that Parliament should erect a court "composed of six judges commissioners," to be chosen (it is unclear by whom) from "the most eminent merchants of the kingdom." These commissioners, in turn, would select "a council of merchants" in London and each major port, which would hear disputes in the first instance. (Appeals would lie from the councils to the commissioners.) Child, in contrast, specified that the liverymen of London would directly elect merchant-judges. 95 Merchant courts were a rare bipartisan cause in an era characterized by deep partisan divisions. Bethel, Reynell, Egleton, Cary, and Defoe were all Whigs, 96 but influential Tory authors made similar arguments. Child, the 92. See Weskett, Complete Digest, xxii. 93. For example, Child specified that judges would be paid set fees based on the value of the sum at issue: 6 d for cases up to £10, 12 d for causes up to £100, and 2 s for causes exceeding £100. Josiah Child, A New Discourse of Trade (Glasgow: R. and A. Foulis, 1751), 102-3. He also provided that court officers would be paid according to a table of fees established by the merchant judges-termed "judiciary merchants" by Child-and confirmed by the chief judges of King's Bench and Common Pleas and the lord chief baron of the Exchequer. Ibid., 103.
94. For example, Defoe, unlike Child, specified that merchants could argue cases themselves or ask "any person" to argue on their behalf. He also provided that the courts would be able to admit as evidence both foreign and domestic affidavits, and that litigants would commence their case by presenting written briefs. Defoe 99 No matter what their political leanings, these authors agreed that traditional courts cost too much and wasted merchants' time by "taking men off from their business," to the loss of private parties and the public alike. 100 Defoe presented the most developed argument for merchant courts. The problem with ordinary courts, he argued, was not their substantive law, which already incorporated-at least in theory-commercial custom. Lawyers, however, often misunderstood that custom. "Never was Young Parson more put to it to make out his Text when he's got into the Pulpit without his Notes," Defoe remarked, "than I have seen a Council at the Bar, when he wou'd make out a Cause between two Merchants." Judges were equally confused, and juries even more so. Moreover, common law evidentiary rules hamstrung courts by making it impossible to introduce documentary evidence that was routinely crucial to commercial cases. As a result, even if a case was decided correctly, it took too much time and money to get there. 101 With such prominent and politically diverse advocates, it is unsurprising that the issue of merchant courts soon came before Parliament. When the House of Commons passed a resolution in 1696 calling for the establishment of a Board of Trade, it asked that its commissioners "be impowered to consider the best Methods of settling a Court-Merchant," 102 but although the resolution passed without recorded objection, neither Parliament nor the Board ever took further action on the subject. 103 (London merchants seem to have tried to set up a merchant court themselves in the early 1690s, but this failed in the absence of political support. 104 ) Courts merchant had better success in England's colonies. Charles II erected the first one in Tangier in 1668. 105 Although the Board of Trade disallowed Nevis's court merchant in 1708, citing its "arbitrary and uncertain" power, the Board also suggested that the legislature try again. 106 Other Caribbean colonies seem to have learned from Nevis's example, because the Board later approved courts merchant in St. Christopher (St. Kitts) in 1736 107 and in Montserrat in 1751. 108 After Antigua created a merchant court in 1717, the island's governor proudly reported that it "has considerably advanced our trade in general." 109 He claimed that local merchants clamored for access to the "peculiar advantage" of the tribunal, whose jurisdiction was initially limited to "transient" merchants bringing claims under £100. 110 Merchant courts, long the desire of economists and projectors, had become a reality in England's colonies.
III. The Defeat of Merchant Courts
Why did merchant courts emerge in the colonies but not in the metropole; and why did they emerge in England during the Middle Ages and again in the 1890s, but not during the eighteenth century? The answers lie in the contingencies of British politics; specifically, a combination of selfinterested lobbying by lawyers and a growing ideological commitment by radical Whigs to protecting civil juries. 
A. The Hostility of Lawyers
The first question is why merchant courts emerged more readily in the colonies. Part of the answer was that Parliament had delegated the matter to the Board of Trade, which soon became overwhelmed with colonial business and was relatively toothless domestically. Although the Board was sensitive to merchants' needs, "it could only serve as a sympathetic complaints bureau, with no power to solve their problems," and it could do no more than react to initiatives begun elsewhere. 111 Such initiatives came mostly from the colonies, where the legal profession exercised less power to block institutional innovation than in London. By the end of the seventeenth century, common lawyers had proven their ability to resist challenges to their monopoly on litigation. In the 1650s and 1660s, for example, barristers and judges had collaborated to eviscerate the Court of Assurances. 112 Later, they obstructed efforts to create a national land title registry, despite the idea's enjoying support from the crown, economists, and some landowners. 113 Unsurprisingly, then, contemporaries blamed lawyers for England's failure to create merchant courts. 114 Lawyers opposed the new courts, one pamphleteer claimed, because the new tribunals would "hinder the hellish grist seem to have accepted lawyers' argument that no court could function properly without a trained bar. 117 Civil lawyers also resisted merchant courts. The civilian Richard Zouch, for example, acknowledged the superiority of the law merchant for handling commercial disputes. He insisted, however, that they were best resolved in the existing court of admiralty, of which he had been a judge, and before which civil lawyers could practice. 118 (Merchants and economists generally disagreed, finding admiralty just as "tedious and expensive" as common law courts, and of insufficiently broad jurisdiction to meet many merchants' needs. 119 )
Lawyers' opposition helps to explain why courts merchant emerged in England's colonies but not in England. London-based lawyers had little incentive to interfere with colonial litigation; most colonies lacked a powerful bar of their own, which freed them to experiment with new legal institutions; 120 and the Crown or colonial legislatures could erect overseas courts without parliamentary approval. As a result, merchant courts quickly found strong support both in the colonies and among metropolitan administrators. It is possible that if England had created merchant courts, lawyers would have found a way to colonize them, just as they colonized local courts (and arbitration) during the eighteenth century, 121 but it was safer for the profession to resist reform altogether. 122 Although lawyers played an important role in shaping the geography of merchant courts, professional interest politics offers only a partial explanation for their continued absence in England. After 1751, even colonies stopped creating merchant courts. 123 At approximately the same time, the legal profession grew increasingly ideologically fragmented, and barristers began to generate some of the most radical calls for reform. 124 If lawyers alone were to blame for England's initial failure to create merchant courts, then the colonies should have continued to create them, and England should have started to experiment with them, in the 1750s.
B. The Politicization of Law Reform
Partisan politics was the decisive factor in Britain's rejection of merchant courts after 1750. The broad support courts merchant had enjoyed during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had been an unusual departure from England's broader tradition of distrusting juryless tribunals. On one hand, under the Stuarts, many Englishmen had been deeply suspicious of juryless courts, which they associated with royal abuse of power. 125 The Court of Star Chamber-known both for its importance in commercial adjudication and for its politically motivated prosecutions-was the most notorious example, although the Court of Chancery also created anxiety. 126 Starting in the 1690s, however, the fear of juryless courts faded. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament met more frequently, which improved its ability to supervise the judiciary, 127 and the "doctrinalization" of Chancery convinced many observers that equity jurisdiction had evolved from the mere discretion of royally appointed chancellors into a predictable body of law. 128 At the same time, England's rapid economic growth convinced many observers of the inadequacy of existing legal institutions. 129 By the early eighteenth century, the combination of a reduced threat from a tyrannical crown and an urgent need for reform generated a broad willingness to experiment with alternatives to common law procedure. 130 The lawyer Joshua Fitzsimmonds, for example, garnered positive reviews when he argued that courts should offer different procedures depending upon the amount in controversy. He proposed that full trials would be reserved for debts worth more than ₤10; debts between ₤5 and 130. See, for example, Lieberman, Province of Legislation Determined, 25-26, 288; see also Animadversions, 1 (reciting the "frequently used" proverb that " [t] hat no Nation hath better Laws, nor worse executed, than the English").
₤10 would be handled by juries in local sheriff's courts; and debts worth less than ₤5 would fall to courts of requests. 131 The willingness to experiment collapsed starting in the 1760s, as law reform-like other aspects of British life-became more sharply politicized. In the wake of the Seven Years' War, British politics experienced a major realignment, as an increasingly influential group of "authoritarian Whigs" 132 sought to reshape law and governance in the British Empire. Authoritarian Whigs were a loose alliance more than a party-even contemporaries struggled to assign them party labels 133 -but they shared a common legal ideology. Like earlier Whigs, authoritarian Whigs considered the common law an important pillar of Britain's revolutionary settlement, but they also saw social disorder as a growing threat to that settlement, both because a disorderly Britain was more vulnerable to external attack and because disorder undermined the rule of law by substituting mob-dominated juries for the impartial justice promised by the Glorious Revolution. 134 Eventually, these concerns led many authoritarian Whigs to conclude that only by reducing litigation-and curtailing the role of juries-could they defend the promise of English law more generally.
One of the leaders of this movement was Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, who enjoyed a complicated relationship with juries. Like his colleagues on the bench, Mansfield recognized juries' utility as fact-finders, particularly in commercial cases, in which he used merchant juries with great success to identify merchant customs and to sort through complex facts. 135 But like other judges, Mansfield also depended heavily on various mechanisms of jury control. 136 Over time, he seems to have become increasingly concerned about juries' tendency to ignore judicial direction and to render verdicts contrary to the law, particularly in politically charged cases. 137 Even as he made expert use of merchant juries in his development of commercial doctrine, he sought to limit juries' power in a number of other respects, particularly in England's colonies. 138 From his position in the House of Lords, Mansfield also sought unsuccessfully to have judges decide, "in a summary manner" and without juries or a right of appeal, all cases involving annuities. 139 Other Whigs, especially "radical" or "patriot" Whigs such as William Pitt the Elder and John Wilkes, objected sharply to the authoritarian legal agenda. In contrast to authoritarian Whigs' fear of social disorder, radicals worried primarily about the abuse of executive power, and they saw politically conscious juries as essential defenders of British freedom. 140 (One leading radical lawyer, Lord Camden, led opposition to Mansfield's proposal to remove juries from annuities cases. 141 ) Radicals accused authoritarian Whigs of trying to make "the trial by jury useless and ridiculous," both in the colonies and in England, 142 and of importing civilian ideas derived from Roman law and Jacobitism. "The Roman code, the law of nations, and as indispensible throughout the eighteenth century-came under attack. Reformers had once hoped that the popularity of these courts might pave the way for broader experiments in civil procedure. 151 Now, however, supporters of the courts found themselves on the defensive. Blackstone denounced their "petty tyranny" in his influential Commentaries, 152 and even the Monthly Review-which had favorably viewed Fitzsimmonds's farreaching reform proposal thirty years earlier-came to embrace Blackstone's conservative vision of the legal institutions. 153 These attacks put politicians in a difficult position. On one hand, they had little interest in abolishing courts of request completely. Although Members of Parliament had started to doubt the courts' ability "to further Justice" and to worry that their power was "too great for the little Solemnity in the process, the rapidity of the determination, and the quality and Number of the Magistrates," even as staunch a Whig as Edmund Burke recognized that small-claims courts played a well-defined and irreplaceable role in facilitating the circulation of credit. 154 Parliament eventually settled on the compromise of resisting the creation of new courts and limiting the power of existing ones. In 1779, Parliament eliminated their authority to imprison defendants for debts under £10, much to the dismay of merchant creditors. 155 Seven years later, another statute instituted new property requirements for the courts' commissioners (i.e., lay judges) and further regulated their power of arrest. 156 Colonial legislatures also took note: by 1774, it was clear that courts of conscience in Georgia, for example, would employ juries. 157 With legislatures skeptical of even well-established juryless courts, advocates of merchant courts faced a difficult task in explaining why those new tribunals would be consistent with traditional forms of English liberty.
The insurance writer John Weskett, for example, suggested that the courts might publish reports of their decisions 158 -a practice still not fully developed in the Westminster courts 159 -so as to improve transparency. 160 Weskett was so enthusiastic about his plans for a commercial tribunal that he sent a copy to John Adams, then the American ambassador in London, but his proposals never found an audience in England. 161 Another rhetorical possibility was to recast merchant courts in the language of common law institutions. This technique had been a promising way to defend courts of request, whose defenders reframed the tribunals, which were composed of five or more commissioners, as specialized juries. 162 Thomas Mortimer tried a similar approach in rebranding courts merchant as "commercial juries," not all that different from the special juries used in common law courts, 163 but that approach was quickly becoming problematic, as special juries themselves started to face the wrath of radicals. Although critiques of special juries would reach a new pitch in the nineteenth century, the attack began in the 1770s. The value of special juries, especially in merchant cases, derived from the jurors' superior expertise. (Thomas Gorman, for example, served at various times as a special juror, an arbitrator, and an expert witness.) 164 But as special jurors became known as experts on whom judges might repeatedly call, radicals questioned their independence. Writers had long worried about abuse of special juries in seditious libel cases-one writer speculated that the government bribed jurors with "an elegant dinner at Appleby's," 165 and Samuel Johnson had fantasized about a golden age when there were "no special juries known" 166 -but they now became suspect even in commercial cases. 167 By 1793, Thomas Erskine needed to explain that "[s]pecial juries do not exist, as many people seem to suppose, by the authority of a modern statute; on the contrary, They are as ancient as the law itself." 168 Radical critiques were insufficiently powerful to undermine the well-established institution of special juries. They were sufficiently troubling, however, to prevent the creation of new institutions that moved closer to transforming jurymen into dependent officers of the court.
C. Improvements in Common Law Litigation
Although radicals portrayed juryless litigation as an authoritarian project, the leading authoritarian Whigs never embraced merchant courts. Mansfield, in particular, never seems have given courts merchant much consideration. Instead, he focused on making King's Bench more hospitable to commercial cases, such as by developing rules to expedite litigation. 169 Perhaps more importantly, he replicated one key advantage of merchant courts-allowing merchants themselves to pronounce on commercial custom-by expanding the use of special juries, often composed of experienced merchants who served frequently as advisors in mercantile cases. 170 Mansfield's efforts were exceptional, but they fit into a broader pattern of common law courts' finding ways to improve their treatment of commercial litigation. In addition to special juries, these included the use of expert assessors who sat with the judge during the trial, calling merchants as expert witnesses, and consulting merchants for ex parte advice. 171 By the end of the century, these innovations had helped to shape commercial litigation not only in England but in the newly independent United States. 172 By incorporating special jurors and other merchant-advisers into common law litigation, Mansfield was also able to advance his project of building commercial cases into a coherent body of law. 173 One of his primary objectives in reforming commercial law was to provide litigants with certainty-which he called "the great object in every branch of the law, but especially in mercantile law" 174 -even at the expense of other values, such as jury participation or developing a perfect substantive law. 175 Several of Mansfield's innovations, including his focus on the science of pleading and the use of special juries and alternative verdicts, were intended primarily to clarify the holding of each case in a way that would guide future conduct. 176 Delegating commercial litigation to a separate court would have undermined these efforts. Although a merchant court might have published its decisions, 177 England's jurisdictional multiplicity already hampered the development of precedent, and it would have taken time for courts to clarify the relative weight of authority between decisions of the new tribunal and those of existing courts. 178 (Of course, a new tribunal would also have detracted from the authority of Mansfield and his brother judges, which may have further reduced their enthusiasm for courts merchant.)
Authoritarian Whigs also had reasons to encourage arbitration, rather than merchant courts, as an alternative to common law litigation. As James Oldham has noted, "Mansfield's encouragement of arbitration was but one aspect of his relentless efforts to get parties to settle their disputes." 179 Mansfield's desire to reduce unnecessary litigation reflected his politics, as well as a desire for judicial economy. As noted, authoritarian Whigs such as Mansfield worried that excessive litigation was destabilizing society. Frivolous lawsuits, they argued, sapped both the economy and the social ties that underpinned an orderly society. 180 Authoritarian Whigs worked especially hard to reduce the volume of litigation in the colonies, where imperial administrators considered or implemented a number of experiments to curtail litigiousness, 181 including the hated Stamp Act, which its sponsors hoped would "discourage a spirit of unnecessary litigation" in the colonies by taxing legal documents. 182 Encouraging arbitration at home furthered the same goal of reducing "that Litigation . . . which is already a Disgrace to the Country," as Mansfield once described it. 183 In short, the economic and political agenda of authoritarian Whigs led them to steer some disputes toward arbitration while improving the efficiency of litigating big commercial cases in the central courts. These reforms were far-reaching but incomplete cures for the perceived evils of commercial dispute resolution. Lawsuits in common law courts remained expensive and slow, and those courts continued to struggle with fact-finding in commercial cases. 184 As important as Mansfield's reforms were, they seem to have been most beneficial for large, trans-Atlantic trading firms, rather than smaller merchants and manufacturers. 185 Nonetheless, litigants seem to have responded favorably. Litigation in King's Bench, which had declined in the decades before Mansfield's tenure, increased in the half century after 1750, even as litigation in Common Pleas and Chancery declined. The only courts to see comparable growth in volume were the courts of requests. 186 At a time when merchant courts were politically suspect, Mansfield's reforms made it harder to argue that new legal institutions were economically necessary. James Allan Park, who wrote an important treatise on marine insurance, noted "the fashion of late years to insist upon the advantages" of creating a specialized insurance court, 187 but he dismissed these calls as "proof of the weakness and fallibility of the human mind"; the Court of King's Bench, he insisted, was more than adequate. Park was undoubtedly guilty of flattering Mansfield, a friend and mentor, 188 but Park's belief that Mansfield had clarified insurance law and cured several "defects . . . in the proceedings of our courts" was widely shared. 189 Not everyone agreed with Park's generous assessment, but in a time when juryless courts were politically toxic, the existing system of formalized arbitration and more commercially intelligent courts in Westminster Hall had become good enough to dampen calls for more fundamental reform.
IV. Conclusion
Britain's decision not to create merchant courts had important implications for the development of Anglo-American law. By rejecting specialized courts for commercial cases, Britain ensured that future doctrinal development remained in the hands of generalist judges, even in a relatively technical field. Although courts outsourced complex fact-finding, and sometimes even law-finding, to arbitrators, experts, Chancery masters, and special juries, ultimate control remained with judges themselves.
The continuing absence of merchant courts in England both reflected and enabled an increasingly Manichean distinction, especially among radical Whigs, between "good" common law courts and unacceptable alternatives. Dispute resolution mechanisms that did not fit neatly into either category were quashed (such as merchant courts), explained away as traditional exceptions (such as courts of requests), or, in the case of arbitration, conceptually exiled from the realm of litigation altogether. Arbitration was particularly problematic for radical Whigs: it was too deeply rooted in English history and practice to abolish, but it also seemed to flaunt the traditional norm of trial by jury. 190 "There is one feature which a submission to arbitration, and a delegation of jurisdiction to a specialized tribunal . . . have in common," Sir William Holdsworth noted a century ago. "[I]n both cases jurisdiction is taken from the ordinary courts and is exercised by other tribunals." 191 How, then, could radical opponents of specialized courts reconcile themselves to arbitration?
Over time, radicals reconceived of arbitration as a purely private affair, even when courts enforced arbitral awards. The ideological privatization of arbitration was already beginning by the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries. Although he acknowledged the role of courts in enforcing arbitral awards, he did so in a chapter titled "the redress of private wrongs by the mere act of the parties." 192 Blackstone's conception of arbitral panels as "peaceable and domestic tribunals"-fundamentally private, albeit vaguely court-like-helps explain why he praised arbitration but condemned juryless public courts. Later writers distinguished between courts and arbitration even more sharply. In 1787, for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court defined arbitration as "a kind of domestic tribunal, which the courts are cautious not to meddle with." 193 The ideological privatization of arbitration was complete by 1805, when Thomas Paine argued that arbitration "concerns [people] as individuals, and not as a State or community, and is not a proper case for a Governor to interfere in, for it is not a State or government concern." 194 Remarkably, Paine wrote this passage in defense of a law that would have made arbitration compulsory. But as someone deeply rooted in and committed to the radical Whig tradition-including its staunch commitment to civil juries 195 -Paine had little choice but to represent arbitration as fundamentally beyond the state, if he was going to accept the practice at all. This is not to say that the debates of the late eighteenth century totally foreclosed the possibility that the Anglo-American legal tradition might find room for merchant courts. British and American reformers seriously considered them, as well as related bodies such as conciliation courts, throughout the nineteenth century. Even these reformers, however, tended to see such tribunals as European imports, rather than the revival of an institution with a long history in English thought and colonial practice. 196 As a result, nineteenth-century debates over specialized courts tended to reinforce the fiction that in common law jurisdictions, "ordinary courts" handled adjudication. 197 This fiction, in turn, would underpin the influential critique by Dicey and others of administrative courts, which they saw as fundamentally antithetical to the Anglo-American legal tradition. 198 (It surely added plausibility to Dicey's critique that Britain had just rejected another attempt to establish tribunals of commerce in the 1870s. 199 )
England's tradition of ordinary courts continues to shape analyses of juryless litigation today, particularly in the context of administrative law. For example, two prominent studies by Jerry Mashaw and Philip Hamburger, although quite different in their normative conclusions, agree that a system of specialized courts, unreviewable by common law judges, would have been alien to Anglo-American constitutional traditions. 200 Hamburger goes farther, arguing that our current system of administrative adjudication runs afoul of our nation's longstanding historical commitment to trial by jury. Although he acknowledges England's history of prerogative tribunals, such as excise commissions, he argues that such "nonjudicial adjudications" were so widely hated that they "cannot be considered a reliable precedent for contemporary administrative adjudication." 201 experiments in private dispute resolution-we would do well to be clear about which history we are invoking, to recall the contingencies that have shaped the system we have inherited, and to remember that what we hold for ancient law was itself the product of partisan debate.
